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Our national security and prosperity depend in part on secure and competitive 
ports.  Effective public and private sector collaboration is needed in a world with myriad 
security challenges and fierce global competition.  Although steps have been taken in the 
years since 9/11 to realize these twin goals much more needs to be done.  The current 
maritime domain awareness (MDA) paradigm needs to be expanded to provide 
comprehensive awareness of intermodal operations in our ports.  An effective Open 
Source Intelligence (OSINT) program that succeeds in leveraging intermodal data is 
fundamental to better port-level MDA.  Developing effective port level MDA and using it 
to enhance the security of our ports relies on the effective organization of public and 
private sector resources.  The joint operations centers called for in the SAFE Port Act, 
once broadened to include key intermodal players, provide an excellent organizational 
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Ports are critical to our economy and national security. Key hubs in the 
international trade network, U.S. ports accounted for more than $948 billion in 
waterborne trade in 2004 and are forecasted to realize rapid growth in international trade 
shipments in the next 10-15 years.  New York and New Jersey expect a tripling of cargo 
throughput by 2020.  Ports also equate to jobs.  More than 4 million Americans work in 
port-related jobs that generate over $44 billion in annual personal income.  In light of the 
tremendous economic vitality represented by American ports, it is not surprising that port 
closures resulting from an attack could cause $1 trillion in damages to the economy. 
Ports have strategic importance to the military.  Fourteen commercial and three 
military ports comprise a domestic network needed for military deployments.  The build 
up for Operation Iraqi Freedom is a recent example in which ports proved essential to the 
shipment of cargo needed for the war effort.   
America needs secure ports.  The National Strategy for Maritime Security states 
that ports “have inherent security vulnerabilities.” One of the strategic actions identified 
as requisite to achieving maritime security is to maximize domain awareness.  Current 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) initiatives focus on monitoring vessels, cargo, crew 
and passengers. 
Ports, however, are not vulnerable only on the waterside.  Ports are intermodal 
hubs used to affect the transfer of products involving multiple modes of transportation- 
truck, railroad and ocean carrier. Ports are vulnerable in part because of this convergence 
of landside and waterside operations. 
The next step in the development of MDA should seek more comprehensive 
awareness of intermodal operations in America’s ports (i.e., 360° Port MDA) in order to 
address both waterside and landside vulnerabilities to attack and illegal activity. 
A strategy to improve port security.  360° Port MDA is proposed as a 
supporting element of modally integrated security regimen at U.S. ports.  In order to 
achieve 360° MDA an open-source intelligence (OSINT) program that fully exploits 
public and private sector intermodal data is needed.  It is suggested that the Coast Guard- 
the designated lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security and a member of the 
Intelligence Community- should lead this effort.   
Although more robust domain awareness is necessary, it does not of itself 
guarantee improved port security.  One way to realize the value of an enhanced domain 
awareness capability is via joint operations centers that replicate key attributes of Project 
SeaHawk, a unique multi-agency port security organization developed to improve 
collaboration, information and intelligence sharing at the fourth largest port in the 
country, Charleston, South Carolina. 
In summary, it is believed that an OSINT program that exploits intermodal data 
sources will contribute to more comprehensive domain awareness, thus enabling better 
risk-based decision making and improved port security.  This study will examine this 









                                                
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security states that “the safety and economic 
security of the United States depend in substantial part upon the secure use of the world’s 
oceans” and that maritime security is a “vital national interest.”1  A national maritime 
security objective is to protect maritime-related population centers, critical 
infrastructures, key resources, transportation systems, borders, harbors, ports and coastal 
approaches in the maritime domain.2 The United States Coast Guard is the designated 
lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) when responses require civil 
authorities.  The Coast Guard is both an armed force (14 U.S.C. 1) and a law enforcement 
agency (14 U.S.C. 89) located within the Department of Homeland Security.3  In the U.S. 
Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, the Coast Guard articulates its 
mission to protect the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Marine Transportation 
System, deny their use by terrorists, and prepare for and conduct emergency response 
operations if an attack does occur.4  A key strategic element in support of this mission is 
increased Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).  Accordingly, the Coast Guard is a 
central player in the ongoing government efforts to develop a fully integrated MDA 
capability.  MDA seeks to identify as early as possible threats to the United States that 






1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "The National Strategy for Maritime Security," 1, 
September, 2005, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/HSPD13_MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf  
(accessed July 16, 2006). 
2 Ibid., 9. 
3 United States Coast Guard, "Maritime Strategy For Homeland Security," December, 2002, 2. 
http://www.mipt.org/pdf/us-coast-guard-maritime-strategy-homeland-security.pdf. (accessed December 19, 
2005). 




                                                
advantage over our adversaries- the time to determine an appropriate response. In short, 
MDA seeks to provide decision makers with “decision superiority in the maritime 
domain.” 5
The Maritime Domain- defined as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, 
adjacent to or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all 
maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other 
conveyances”- is vital to U.S. interests and global in scope.6  The expansiveness of the 
MDA undertaking is difficult to comprehend.  The United States’ littoral interests alone 
include a 3.4-million-square-mile Exclusive Economic Zone; 95,000 miles of shoreline; 
and 361 ports.7  The challenges implicit in the MDA program are significant. 
United States ports are a particularly important component of the Maritime 
Domain.  Not merely unique geographic features on a coastal chart, ports are key inter-
modal hubs that connect the United States with the world.  In 2004, U.S. ports accounted 
for more than $948 billion in waterborne trade with vital oil shipments accounting for 
$164.8 billion of the total.8  Containerized cargo shipments exceeded 23.8 million 
TEUs.9  Disruptions to our ports are, not surprisingly, costly.  The economic impact of 
the 2002 labor-related west coast port closures was estimated at $1 billion per day for the 
first 5 days.  Furthermore, the Brookings Institution has estimated that a terrorist attack 
 
5 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Plan To Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness," 
8, October, 2005, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf (accessed November 6, 
2005). 
6 U.S. President, "National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive HSPD-13 (Maritime Security Policy),” 2, December 21, 2004, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf (accessed November 6, 2005). 
7 U.S. Coast Guard, "Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian," 5, 
January 1, 2002, http://www.uscg.mil/overview/Pub%201/contents.html (accessed December 19, 2005). 
8 U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, "U.S. Foreign Waterborne Trade: 
Trade Total via All Custom Ports, Top 50 4 Digit Commodities," 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/Marad_Statistics/2005%20STATISTICS/FW-STATS/fw-4-digit-tot-val.xls/ 
(accessed December 29, 2005). 
9 Containership capacity is commonly expressed in terms of twenty-foot equivalent units, or TEU.  A 
TEU is a nominal unit of measure equivalent to a 20'x8'x8' shipping container. U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Maritime Administration, "U.S. Waterborne Foreign Trade: Containerized Cargo by U.S. 
Ports," http://www.marad.dot.gov/Marad_Statistics/2005%20STATISTICS/USPTS-04-CON.XLS/ 




resulting in port closures would cause $1 trillion in damages to the economy.10  Secure 
and efficiently-operated ports are of national significance.   
Given the vastness and complexity of the Maritime Domain, the National Plan to 
Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness adopts a knowledge-centric approach to “facilitate 
timely, accurate decision making.”11  Successful integration of all-source intelligence is a 
key component of MDA.  By definition, all-source intelligence consists of not only 
intelligence derived from technical collection methods- such as imagery intelligence and 
signals intelligence- and human intelligence, but also Open-Source Intelligence 
(OSINT).12  The former methods are used to collect information from protected sources 
while OSINT collects “information of potential intelligence value that is available to the 
general public.”13  OSINT is derived from a wide spectrum of unclassified sources in the 
public and private sectors including academia and the media.   
On December 28, 2001, the long-existing intelligence element of the United 
States Coast Guard became part of the U. S. Intelligence Community (IC) when the 
National Security Act of 1947 was amended.   The Coast Guard Intelligence Program 
(CGIP) manages the intelligence disciplines of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery 
and Geospatial Intelligence (IMINT/GIS) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT).  
However, the Coast Guard, the designated lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland 
Security, does not have an established OSINT policy or program.  Without such a 
program the integration and fusion of OSINT are left to the discretion of each component 
of the CGIP.  At the upper echelons of the CGIP this may not pose much of a problem.  
The Coast Guard’s national-level production center, the Intelligence Coordination Center, 
for example regularly exploits OSINT: media, merchant shipping web sites as well as 
                                                 
10 Congress, Senate, GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., S.2008, 
Government Printing Office, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:s2008pcs.txt.pdf (accessed December 30, 2005). 
11 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Plan To Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness," 
(October 2005), 7, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf (accessed November 6, 
2005). 
12 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-7, Joint Doctrine Division, "Joint Publication 
1-02, DOD Dictionary Of Military And Associated Terms.  As Amended Through 31 August 2005," 2005, 





proprietary data sources such as LexisNexis are regularly used to validate information 
and develop intelligence regarding the maritime industry.  At the lower, tactical levels of 
the CGIP, however, in the absence of a systematic approach to the discipline of OSINT, 
full exploitation of the rich data and information sources that accompany maritime 
operations in our inter-modal ports is unlikely to occur (see figure 1).  As a result, the 
Coast Guard’s ability to contribute to improved MDA and decision superiority in 
fulfillment of its responsibilities as lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security 
is limited. Conversely, an effective OSINT strategy has the potential to improve local 
MDA by including the collection, analysis, fusion and distribution of intelligence 
products based on port-unique open sources.  Stronger MDA enables better decision 
making and operational response. 
 
1.  Primary Research Questions 
Given the following: (1) ports are an immensely important yet vulnerable 
component of the maritime domain, (2) the protection of ports is a national maritime 
security objective and, (3) that maximizing domain awareness is needed to support 
effective decision making related to maritime security; is it possible to prove OSINT adds 
value to tactical level MDA thus enabling decision making and contributing to improved 
port security? 14  If so, what strategy should the Coast Guard, as lead federal agency for 
Maritime Homeland Security, employ to maximize the contributions of OSINT?   
 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
Do open sources used in support of tactical level MHS also enable decision 
making and operational response at the regional, area and national levels? 
How would a Coast Guard OSINT program leverage federal, state and local data 
sources and analytical capabilities?  
Could open sources be used to enhance situational awareness?  
                                                 
14 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "The National Strategy for Maritime Security," 9, 16, 
September, 2005, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/HSPD13_MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf  
(accessed July 16, 2006). 
Could open sources related to merchant vessel operations be used to distinguish 
acceptable patterns from anomalies in U.S. ports?  
How would an OSINT program fit within the Coast Guard Intelligence Program?  
See Figure 1. 
How would a Coast Guard OSINT program align with the broader Intelligence 
Community? 
How could the benefits of an OSINT program be quantified? 
 
 
Figure 1.   Flow of information from National and Regional Coast Guard Sources to 
Area Maritime Security Committees and Interagency Operations Centers at 









                                                
B. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON OSINT 
From its inception in 1947 via the National Security Act through the early 1990s, 
the United States Intelligence Community’s (IC) chief concern was the Soviet Union.  
During this period technical collection dominated intelligence efforts to understand our 
Cold War rival.15  The immense resources driven toward technical intelligence efforts 
relegated Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) to a minor role.  The post-Cold War era 
coincided with the rise of the Information Age and the widespread availability of open 
sources creating a vastly different information environment.  It is now estimated that 80 
percent of U.S. intelligence is derived from open sources with the balance from classified 
intelligence.16  The ascension of open-sources has not been matched by a parallel growth 
in OSINT policy and strategy.  Why?  
There are several overarching issues that exist in assessing the value of OSINT as 
a component of fused, all-source intelligence products.  First, there is still lingering 
disagreement over whether OSINT is indeed “intelligence.”  A 1997 Council on Foreign 
Relations Intelligence Task Force stated: “Intelligence is information not publicly 
available, or analysis based at least in part on such information, that has been prepared 
for policymakers or other actors inside the government. What makes intelligence unique 
is its use of information that is collected secretly and prepared in a timely manner to meet 
the needs of policymakers” (emphasis added).17 Thomas Patrick Carroll echoes the Task 
Force in stating, “by definition, intelligence is clandestinely acquired information- stolen, 
to put it bluntly.”18  To Carroll et al, OSINT is nice to have but not the real thing.  Some 
consumers of intelligence are also dismissive of OSINT.  They perceive it as 
commonplace and absent the allure of exclusivity implicit in classified intelligence 
products.  Arthur S. Hulnick explains that “consumers want intelligence from secret 
 
15 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 13. 
16 Alan Dupont, "Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century," Intelligence and National Security 18, 
no. 4 (Winter 2003): 26. 
17 Richard N. Haass, "Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence," Council On 
Foreign Relations, January 1997, http://www.cfr.org/publication/127/making_intelligence_smarter.html . 
(accessed January 1, 2006). 
18 Thomas Patrick Carroll, "The Case Against Intelligence Openness," International Journal of 




                                                
agents and technical sources- materials they can’t read in the New York Times.”19  As a 
result open sources are overlooked by some and undervalued by others.  
There are some who consider OSINT a valuable commodity, one that should be 
fully exploited.  Mark Lowenthal, a well-respected authority on the IC contends that 
OSINT is “a cost effective, significant source of intelligence.”20  Stephen Mercado, a 
seasoned IC insider writes that OSINT has been an important component of U.S. 
intelligence efforts since the establishment of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service 
(FBIS) in 1941 and that “the revolution in information technology, commerce and 
politics since the Cold War’s end is only making open sources more accessible, 
ubiquitous and valuable.”21  Robert David Steel, perhaps the most vocal and prolific 
advocate of OSINT, makes a compelling case that the United States needs to step up its 
efforts to exploit OSINT.  Steele claims OSINT is both a “force multiplier and resource 
multiplier” due to its broad utility and low cost.22  In his preface to the NATO Open 
Source Intelligence Handbook, then Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, General 
Kernan champions OSINT, stating it supports both the all-source intelligence process as 
well as the “unclassified intelligence requirements of operators, logisticians, and civilian 
organizations participating in joint and coalition operations.”23   Furthermore, current 
Department of Defense doctrine for intelligence support of interagency, joint and 
 
19 Arthur S. Hulnick, "The Downside of Open Source Intelligence," International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 4 (2002): 573. 
20 Mark M. Lowenthal, "OSINT: The State of the Art, the Artless State," Studies in Intelligence 45, 
no. 3 (Fall 2001): 61. 
21 Stephen C. Mercado, "Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the information Age," Studies in Intelligence 48, 
no. 3 (2004), http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no3// (accessed October 7, 2005). 
22 Robert D Steele, “The Importance of Open Source Intelligence to the Military,” ed. Loch K. 
Johnson, James J. Wirtz, Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World (Los Angeles: Roxbury 
Publishing Company, 2004), 112. 
23 Oss.net, "NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook," (November  2001), 
http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/030201/ca5fb66734f540fbb4f8f6ef759b258c/NATO%20OSIN




                                                
multinational operations cites OSINT as one of seven collection disciplines used to 
develop accurate and comprehensive all-source intelligence.24  
The disadvantages attributed to OSINT coalesce around two major issues: 
separating the OSINT wheat from the chaff and the reliability of sources.  Hulnick argues 
convincingly that the wheat/chaff issue is not unique to OSINT, but a problem common 
to each of the collection disciplines.25   Likewise, Hulnick contends that the reliability 
issue challenges other disciplines too and is best resolved by experienced, professional 
analysts who “learn which sources to trust and which are more likely to be incorrect, 
slanted, biased, propaganda or disinformation.”26   NATO’s approach to overcoming 
these impediments is revealed in its comprehensive three-volume series of OSINT 
publications: NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook, NATO Open Source 
Intelligence Reader and Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet. These manuals provide 
field commands with a systematic method to exploit open sources.  
The second overarching question is where OSINT fits in the IC collection 
discipline paradigm.  There is consensus among proponents of OSINT that, although 
OSINT is “not a panacea for all intelligence requirements,” the IC is not effectively 
exploiting OSINT.27  Furthermore, with the exception of a few pockets of OSINT 
excellence, most OSINT is conducted on an ad hoc basis by analysts and that a 
coordinated OSINT infrastructure does not presently exist.  This situation led to divergent 
alternatives being proposed to improve the IC’s OSINT efforts.  The Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 
stated that the “need for exploiting open-source material is greater now than ever before,” 
and recommended “that the DNI create an Open Source Directorate in the CIA to develop 
and utilize information processing tools to enhance the availability of open-source 
 
24 Joint Chiefs of Staff United States Department of Defense, J-7, Joint Doctrine Division, "Joint 
Publication 2-0, Doctrine For Intelligence Support Of Joint Operations," 
Http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s_index.html, March 9, 2000, / (accessed January 27, 2006). 
25 Hulnick, “The Downside of Open Source Intelligence”, 566-567. 
26 Ibid., 567-568. 




                                                
information to analysts, collectors and users of intelligence.”28  Congress also urged the 
DNI to consider establishing an Open Source Intelligence center.29  The DNI concurred 
and, “recognizing the importance of open source information to the intelligence mission,” 
created the DNI Open Source Center on November 1, 2005.30  Still other proposals called 
for department-centric versus IC-wide OSINT capabilities.  Congress directed the 
Secretary of Defense “to develop a strategy for the purpose of integrating open-source 
intelligence into the Defense intelligence process.”31  It was also suggested that the 
Department of Homeland Security “establish its own OSINT agency or center to meet the 
unique needs of its constituents.” 32  
When it comes to the idea of outsourcing OSINT, there are some differences in 
opinion.  Steele, a member of the private sector, argues that the existing government 
OSINT capability is inadequate and that a robust OSINT program would aggressively 
leverage the existing capabilities of the private sector to both collect and analyze open 
source information.  Mercado and Lowenthal argue in favor of a stronger in-house 
OSINT capability that selectively leverages existing private sector technology and 
capabilities.33
The third overarching issue involving OSINT involves the need for improved 
information sharing. The 9/11 Commission Report highlights that sharing all-source 
 
28 Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, Co-Chairmen, Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2005), 378-379. http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html  (accessed October 7, 2005). 
29 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Sec. 1052. 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/intel_reform.html. (accessed October 9, 2005) 
30 Mary Margaret Graham, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection to John D. 
Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, DNI Open Source Center Memorandum of Agreement 
(Washington, D.C., October 21, 2005). 
31 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, secs. 931.  
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h1815enr.txt.pdf 
(accessed December 30, 2005). 
32 Congress, House, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Hearing on “Using Open Source Information Effectively,” 109th 
Cong., 1st sess., June 21, 2005.  http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/062105jardines.pdf (accessed 
October 2, 2005). 




                                                
intelligence is vital, but that a “need to know” culture restricts information flows.34   The 
Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age argues that 
in order to achieve better Homeland Security, attaining improved capacity for 
information sharing is essential.35  OSINT, because it is derived from unclassified 
sources is, at least initially, free of the encumbrances of classified documents that due to 
their classified nature are difficult to share.  Organizations may, however, elect to restrict 
OSINT products for several reasons: to protect valuable sources of information and 
methods of exploitation and/or to limit opposing forces’ knowledge of the commander’s 
intent.  Nevertheless, OSINT, by virtue of its unique attributes - speed of acquisition, 
quantity, transparency, cost and ease of use - represents a partial solution to the 
information sharing dilemma that plagues government entities striving to achieve 
improved agility. 36    
In summary, there is little literature that disparages OSINT.  The literature 
supporting the broadening of OSINT is largely consistent in its expression via logically 
presented argument that focuses on several key points: that IC collection and analysis 
needs exceed existing capabilities and that information sharing must improve.  OSINT 
can be leveraged to help satisfy intelligence requirements and can be shared readily.  The 
literature diverges on how to best improve IC OSINT capabilities.  For other than the 
CIA and the Department of Defense, the literature concerning the strategic employment 
of OSINT by members of the IC, the Coast Guard included, is virtually non-existent. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The result of this study is a strategy recommendation for the Coast Guard and 
interagency use to more fully exploit OSINT in support of MHS.  The recommendation is 
 
34 Thomas H. Kean, Chairman, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 417. 
35Zoe Baird and James L. Barksdale, Co-Chairmen, Protecting America's Freedom in the Information 
Age: A report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, 2, http://www.markletaskforce.org/ (accessed  
October 7, 2005). 
36 Stephen C. Mercado, "Reexamining the Distinction Between Open Information and Secrets," 





aligned with The National Strategy for Maritime Security and is based on evidence 
collected via interviews and a case study. 
Interviews conducted with practitioners in the Coast Guard Intelligence Program 
were used to illustrate the status of existing OSINT practices within the Coast Guard.   
Several additional interviews of experts in the field of intelligence were used to provide a 
perspective external to the Coast Guard on the value of OSINT.   
In the case study OSINT practices employed at Project SeaHawk, an Intermodal 
Transportation and Port Security Pilot Project located in the port of Charleston were 
analyzed.  Established by Congress in the FY2003 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, 
SeaHawk entails both a Joint Harbor Operations Center and multi-agency task force.  
One of SeaHawk’s core functions is field level data collection, fusion and intelligence 
development.  This function leverages the contributions of a broad array of Federal, State 
and Local agencies as well as private sector contractors to achieve tactical MDA and 
drive operations.  SeaHawk has strong Congressional support and current legislation- 
GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act and the SAFE Port Act- proposes the creation of  
additional joint operations centers  for maritime and cargo security.  SeaHawk provided 
an opportunity to explore existing OSINT practices and to consider their application to 








































                                                
II. CURRENT OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES 
A. THE U.S. COAST GUARD AND OSINT 
The National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 
9/11 Commission), and The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction highlighted the importance of 
intelligence to countering the threats of the 21st century.  The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security in citing Intelligence and Warning as a critical mission area bluntly 
and accurately states that “terrorism depends on surprise.”37  When one looks beyond the 
threat of terrorism to a horizon that encompasses “all hazards”, intelligence grows in even 
greater importance.  Extracting maximum value from the Coast Guard’s intelligence 
organization is vital to field commanders who need full situational awareness to allocate 
finite resources.   
The Coast Guard Intelligence Program (CGIP) is vertically organized with each 
echelon having clearly defined roles.  See Table 1.   The Field Intelligence Support Team 
(FIST) serves port level operational commanders, primarily the Captain of the Port, by 
collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence on all maritime threats in the region.  
In the execution of its mission, a FIST maintains active liaison with other law 
enforcement and intelligence organizations with a presence in the area (e.g. FBI, DEA, 
Army National Guard, local police departments et al) as well as with designated 
Command Intelligence Officers (CIOs) at Coast Guard field units.  FISTs regularly 
leverage access to the SIPRNET to exploit intelligence developed by the broader 
Intelligence Community. 38   FISTs also produce and forward intelligence related to their 
port and coastal area to the District intelligence staff, the Area Maritime Intelligence 
Fusion Center (MIFC) and the national Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC). 39   The 
 
37 Office of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland Security,  (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2002), viii. 
38 SIPRNET  (Secret Internet Protocal Router Network) is used to transmit information classified up to 
the SECRET level. Lieutenant Johnnie Messer, FIST Charleston, interview by author, January 5, 2006, via 
telephone. 
39 Lieutenant Marc Sennick, FIST Boston, interview by author, September 12, 2005, Boston, MA. 
District and Area Intelligence Staffs as well as the Atlantic and Pacific MIFCs have 
broader geographic areas of interest than FISTs, as well as different responsibilities. 
 
 
Table 1. U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Organization40
 
•Advise port-level operational commanders
•Disseminate intelligence received from other CG/IC sources
•Local LE/Intel liaison
•Collect HUMINT, IMINT






•Provide  intelligence to operational commanders
•Serve as theater hub for maritime intelligence collection, fusion, 
analysis, dissemination 
Maritime Intelligence Fusion 
Centers (MIFC)
•Advise Area Commander/Staff
•Manage Area/Theater-wide intelligence efforts
Area Intelligence Staff 
•Produce Strategic Intelligence
•Lead collection and analysis  coordination efforts between 
CG/IC 
•Partner with ONI at National Maritime Intelligence Center
Intelligence Coordination Center 
(ICC)
•Advise the Commandant of the CG on intelligence issues
•Program management
•Coordinate plans and policy with IC






                                                 
40 Table 1 is a synthesis of information derived from interviews cited in this chapter, the author’s 
personal knowledge and the following: U.S. Coast Guard, "Coast Guard Intelligence Capstone Document," 







                                                
The extent with which open sources are utilized varies across the CGIP, but in 
general terms, exploitation is “a mile wide and an inch deep.”  Open source utilization 
typically includes review of unclassified maritime industry web sites and databases, such 
as those maintained by port authorities and shipping companies, as well as a variety of 
government web sites (e.g. Open Source Information System).41  Industry journals and 
major media sources are also routinely consulted (e.g. Journal of Commerce, CNN et al) 
as are subscriptions to commercial intelligence (e.g. Jane’s Information Group, Maritime 
Intelligence Group) and information services (e.g. LexisNexis).    
A number of factors conspire to limit the use of open sources.   
• Timeliness: The time required to find and exploit “good” information 
sources can be a significant disincentive.42   
• Convenience and Relevance: One Coast Guard analyst emphasized 
classified information available via the SIPRNET was both more 
convenient to access and much more relevant to his duties than searching 
for open sources.  In other words there is more “wheat” and less “chaff”.43  
• Quality: The source of the information must be carefully vetted before 
being deemed reliable. 44 
Experience with exploiting open sources is primarily a matter of on-the-job 
training augmented in part by OSINT components within formal military intelligence 
education programs.  The CGIP does not presently have a standard OSINT toolset. 45   
 
41 Commander Sam Sumpter, USCG Intelligence Coordination Center, interview by author, December 
1, 2005, via telephone. 
42 Lieutenant Marc Sennick, FIST Boston, interview by author, September 12, 2005, Boston, MA. 
43 Lieutenant Johnnie Messer, FIST Charleston, interview by author, January 5, 2006, via telephone. 
44 Commander Sam Sumpter, USCG Intelligence Coordination Center, interview by author, December 
1, 2005, via telephone. 
45 Ibid. 
B. OTHER PERSPECTIVES IN GOVERNMENT ON OSINT 
External to the Coast Guard there is growing interest in effectively leveraging 
open sources.  The Director of National Intelligence’s Open Source Center (OSC), built 
on the foundation of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), focuses on 
collection and analysis of foreign sources of information.  The Open Source Center web 
site clearly reflects this emphasis in its extensive collection of blogs, videos, commentary 
and source documents. Results for a search for information related to port security, 
however, yielded only a limited number of documents suggesting some limitations on the 
tactical value of OSC to maritime homeland security.  See Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Open Source Center Search Results 






















                                                
In addition to continuing its support of the Central Intelligence Agency, OSC is 
chartered to advance the Intelligence Community’s access to and exploitation of open 
sources.  That said, the memorandum establishing the OSC states that “Intelligence 
Community open-source community shall function as a distributed enterprise with each 
element executing open-source resources and activities in direct support of its mission 
needs.” 46  
The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
(OI&A) is in the process of growing an OSINT program that will focus on domestic open 
sources.  Targeting domestic sources will differentiate DHS from OSC which collects 
foreign open sources. The Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department of Homeland 
Security cited the development of an open source concept of operations as a significant 
accomplishment.  The program will create a staff of open source specialists who will 
gather open-source information and purchase access to proprietary open sources. It is 
expected that a dedicated open source staff will achieve “economies of scale, quality 
control and qualification of sources.” 47   
An unanswered question regarding the DHS open source concept of operations is 
to what extent the open source staff will focus internally (i.e. serve DHS agencies) versus 
externally (i.e. serve broader federal government needs).  How much should the Coast 
Guard expect from a DHS open source staff?  A current DHS product is the Daily Open 
Source Infrastructure Report.  This product summarizes open source information related 
to the critical infrastructure sectors and key assets defined in the National Strategy for the 
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.48  The report is a 
compilation of press clippings with only occasional relevance to port security.  The report 
 
46 Mary Margaret Graham, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection to John D. 
Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, DNI Open Source Center Memorandum of Agreement 
(Washington, D.C., October 21, 2005). 
47 Charles E. Allen, "Progress of the DHS Intelligence Officer," U.S. House Of Representatives 
Committee On Homeland Security, May 24, 2006, 8, http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyAllen2.pdf. 
(accessed June 16, 2006). 
48 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Daily Open Source Infrastructure Report," Threats And 
Protection, Critical Infrastructure, June 6, 2006, 




                                                
does not include any analysis of the sources.  If the past is prologue, then the Coast Guard 
should expect little direct OSINT support from DHS I&A. 
A sister agency in the DHS with which the Coast Guard works closely on issues 
of maritime security is the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE and 
the Coast Guard work in partnership on intelligence sharing initiatives such as Operation 
Watchtower which involves the development of counter-terrorism intelligence related to 
vessel, crew and cargo movements into and out of our busiest ports. ICE intelligence 
officials, like their Coast Guard counterparts, gather broad industry information via print 
and online sources.  Lloyd’s Register- Fairplay (researching merchant fleets and maritime 
companies), SeaSearcher (ship tracking and port traffic monitoring) and ChoicePoint’s 
AutoTrack (researching individuals and businesses) as well as Google and Yahoo were 
identified as frequently tapped resources. 49
ICE also uses open sources to research law enforcement leads and to provide 
investigators with an open source equivalent to classified information.  The ease of 
sharing open sources with law enforcement personnel is considered a significant attribute 
by both analysts and field agents.   Analysts enjoy the ability to “pass the word” without 
divulging sources while agents are happy to not deal with the challenges associated with 
safeguarding classified material. Somewhat surprisingly, the inconvenience of using 
SIPRNET terminals restricted to secure office spaces drives agents to more fully use 
open sources which they may access from their desk. 50   
Open source shortcomings encountered by ICE in some instances parallel those 
noted by Coast Guard intelligence personnel and in other cases extend the challenge of 
fully exploiting open sources via an effective OSINT program.  Specific issues involve 




49 Brendan O'Rourke, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Intelligence, interview by author, 





                                                
• Collection can be a very time consuming.  Going though individual web 
sites can be a huge time sink.  
• Cum grano salis.  Most sources come without a pedigree so the reliability 
of the information is unknown. 
• OPSEC risk.  The host may be able to deduce if the U.S. government 
visiting their site. 
• Lack of training.  Exploiting open sources is an art largely based on 
experience gained via on-the-job training.  The absence of an established 
training plan accentuates some analysts’ tendencies to become immersed 
in and rely exclusively on classified sources of information. 51   
• Open source information is not pervasive.  There is considerable 
information available for the major players but relatively little for the 
small market niche shippers in the maritime world. 
• Language limitations.  English only analysts are capable of only partially 
exploiting open sources.  In addition, the information in an English 
version open source may differ markedly in tone if not content from 
foreign language versions. 
• Open sources are an egalitarian resource.  Open sources are not 
exclusively the domain of the U.S. and our allies, they are available free or 
at the same cost to opposing forces. 
 
C. FINDINGS 
OSINT programs are effectively in their infancy within the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Coast Guard and ICE.  Maturation will likely parallel the 
commercial development of increasingly sophisticated tools used to collect and fuse 
relevant data sets.  Relieved of this burden, analysts will be able to focus their efforts on 
analysis, thus distilling real value from open sources. However, until acquisition and use 
of these tools is common among the maritime partners, organizations such as the Coast 
 
51 James Dargan, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Intelligence, National program 




Guard, ICE and other federal, state, local and private sector entities with a stake in the 
security of U.S. ports should aggressively pursue partnerships that accelerate the sharing 




                                                
III. CASE STUDY: PROJECT SEAHAWK 
United States is at war against terrorism.  The philosophical and figurative if not 
strategic leader of the global jihadi movement, Osama Bin Laden, has urged his followers 
to attack the United States.  On December 27, 2001, Bin Laden stated: “It is important to 
hit the economy (of the United States), which is the base of its military power.”52  On 
November 1, 2004, Bin Laden reiterated his “policy in bleeding America to the point of 
bankruptcy” and claimed that the 9/11 attacks cost al-Qaida $500,000 while the U.S. lost 
more than $500 billion.53
Ports are an alluring target when considered in light of their value to the United 
States economy as inter-modal hubs.  The convergence of rail, road, air and sea enables 
global connectivity which is essential to United States economic competitiveness.  
However, the tremendous volume of goods, product and people that move through ports 
represent not only present and future economic vitality, but also vulnerability.  A 
successful port attack via one or more of these key components of the transportation 
infrastructure would be a well placed blow to the economy as well as an opportunity to 
reduce U.S. power and influence.  In the highly interconnected global economy of the 
twenty-first century, a successful attack on a United States port would serve as prima 
facie evidence of poor security.  The Unites States would be viewed as a weak link in the 
global supply chain.  Trade partners could well look to insulate themselves from that 
perceived weakness by seeking alternative trade routes thus exacerbating the United 
States’ already unfavorable balance of trade.54  An attack on a United States port offers 
the potential to realize the type of highly leveraged event favored by Al Qaeda. 
 
 
52 BBC News, December 27, 2001, "Transcript: Bin Laden Video Excerpts," 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1729882.stm/ (accessed March 14, 2006). 
53 Aljazeera.net, October 30, 2004, "Full Transcript Of Bin Ladin's Speech," 
http://english.aljazeera.net/ (accessed March 14, 2006). 
54 United States Department Of Commerce, Bureau Of Economic Analysis, March 9, 2006, "Trade 
Gap Widens In January 2006," http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2006/trad0106_fax.pdf. (accessed 
April 9, 2006). 
A. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOCUS 
On July 13, 2005, Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff announced an agenda 
that identified key issues that DHS would focus on to better protect the United States 
from terrorism.  See Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Department of Homeland Security Six-point Agenda55  
Note: emphasis added by author. 
 
• Increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic events; 
• Create better transportation security systems to move people and cargo 
more securely and efficiently; 
• Strengthen border security and interior enforcement and reform 
immigration processes; 
• Enhance information sharing with our partners; 
• Improve DHS financial management, human resource development, 
procurement and information technology; 
• Realign the DHS organization to maximize mission performance. 
 
Transportation security and border security are particularly salient to the issue of 
security in our ports.  Enhance information sharing with our partners serves to highlight 
the fundamental linkage between security and information sharing.  Effective partnering 
and information sharing between the private sector and local, state, federal government 
entities is a necessity when it comes to port security, a responsibility that is too big a job 
for any one agency to realize.  The extant challenge of information sharing is not new to 
government and a brief review of some relevant efforts to overcome this obstacle serves 






                                                 
55 United States Department of Homeland Security, Press Room, “Homeland Security Secretary 
Michael Chertoff Announces Six-Point Agenda for Department of Homeland Security,” 




                                                
B. ALTERNATIVE COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION-SHARING 
MODELS 
There are presently several different security related organizational models used 
in whole or part to improve collaboration and information sharing.  See Table 4. The 
models, summarized in the following table, offer variations on geographic focus, staffing, 
and mission.  The Charleston Harbor Operations Center, better known as SeaHawk, is a 
particularly attractive model because of its horizontal integration of DHS business 
activities around shared information, multi-agency staffing and focus on preventing acts 
of terrorism in a high value port.  Coast Guard Sector Command Centers (SCCs), located 
in 40 ports across the nation, are in the midst of a multi-year transformation project to 
improve their ability to support not only all Coast Guard missions but also Federal, State 
and local maritime operations.  Implicit in the SCC transformation is the need for 
effective collaboration and information sharing. The SeaHawk pilot project is a model 
developed to improve collaboration, information and intelligence sharing in the fourth 
largest container port in the country, Charleston, South Carolina.56  In evaluating 
SeaHawk the uses of OSINT will be scrutinized to deduce the value added to MDA and  












56 Charleston trails the ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach and New York in container trade. United 
States Department Of Transportation, Maritime Administration, 2006, "U.S. Waterborne Container Trade 
By U.s. Custom Ports, 1997-2005," 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/MARAD_statistics/2005%20STATISTICS/Container%20Custom%20Ports,%2
01997-2005.xls/ (accessed April 23, 2005). 
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C. SEAHAWK’S NICHE 
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States called for 
government to pursue greater unity of effort in intelligence analysis and information 




                                                 
57 Thomas H. Kean, Chairman, 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 400, http://www.9-







                                                
are in the process of establishing intelligence fusion centers in which “local, state and 
federal officials work in close proximity to receive, integrate and analyze information and 
intelligence.”58     
The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) directs the state fusion 
center known as the South Carolina Information Exchange (SCIEx), a statewide 
information sharing initiative connecting more than 300 agencies.  SCIEx is focused on 
becoming a terrorist and criminal information hub serving South Carolina’s law 
enforcement professionals.59  SLED is also a participant in the FBI-sponsored  Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).   JTTFs seek to coordinate law enforcement efforts to 
detect, prevent and respond to terrorism and have been credited with disrupting terrorist 
cells such as the “Portland Seven,” “Lackawanna Six” and the Northern Virginia Jihad.60  
Following 9/11, Attorney General Ashcroft ordered the establishment of Anti- Terrorism 
Task Forces (ATTFs) under the direction of U.S. Attorney’s Offices.  The task forces, 
subsequently renamed Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs), further integrate and 
coordinate federal, state and local activities by serving as senior-level working groups, a 
function distinct from the JTTFs which coordinate day-to-day operations.61   Under the 
umbrella of the ATAC in South Carolina, a pilot program known as Project SeaHawk 
was established in 2003.  SeaHawk was founded to address the concern that the Port of 
Charleston was vulnerable to terrorist attack, an eventuality with potentially significant 





58 Joe Trella, "State Intelligence Fusion Centers: Recent State Actions," NGA Center For Best 
Practices, July 7, 2005, 
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.9123e83a1f6786440ddcbeeb501010a0/?vgnextoid=7d7e37a5
9b066010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD// (accessed March 14, 2006). 
59 Rodger Owens, "South Carolina Training Officer Association Meeting Minutes," South Carolina 
Criminal Justice Academy, February 14, 2006, www.sccja.org/ (accessed March 14, 2006). 
60 The Portland Seven….The Lackawanna Six….Northern Virginia Jihad… 
61 James Casey, "Managing Joint Terrorism," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, November, 2004, 




                                                
D.  ORIGIN, MISSION AND RELEVANCE OF SEAHAWK 
In 2002 Exercise Harbor Shield was conducted in the port of Charleston.  A 
temporary inter-agency operations center established for the exercise proved valuable in 
managing maritime homeland security.  As a result, a model program, “Intermodal 
Transportationand Port Security Pilot Project; Charleston Harbor Operations Center and 
Project SeaHawk Task Force” was established by Congress in the FY2003 Omnibus 
Appropriations Bill.  SeaHawk’s charter is to test the efficacy of multi-agency 
collaboration to security and commerce in the port.  Key functions are: 
• Interagency cooperation; 
• Joint Operations; 
• Unity of Command; 
• Information and Intelligence sharing (Note: emphasis added by author). 
 
Participation in the SeaHawk pilot includes strong representation by local, state 
and federal government entities.62  See Table 5. 
 
62 Captain Scott Beeson, “Executive Briefing SeaHawk”, emailed to author, December 20, 2005. 
Table 5. SeaHawk Participating Agencies (After: Executive Briefing) 
Federal: Department of Justice, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG 
Investigative Service and USCG Field Intelligence Support Team),
Customs & Border Protection, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Internal 
Revenue Service; Defense Criminal Investigative Service; Office of 
Naval Intelligence; Diplomatic Security Service of the Department of 
State; Naval Criminal Investigative Service.  The Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (JTTF) is co-located with Project SeaHawk.
State: South Carolina Law Enforcement Division; State Transport 
Police; State Ports Authority Police Department; South Carolina Air 
National Guard; Department of Health and Environmental Control.
Local: Charleston County Sheriff’s Office; Dorchester County Sheriff’s 
Office; Charleston County Emergency Services; Charleston Area 
Marine Law Enforcement Unit; Charleston County Explosives 
Ordinance Disposal Unit; City of North Charleston Police Department; 
City of Charleston Police Department; Town of Mt. Pleasant Police 
Department.
 
Current legislation- GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act and the Security and 
Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act)- propose the creation of Joint 
Operations Centers for maritime and cargo security that focus on: 
• Information sharing; 
• Day-to-day coordination of operations; 
• Incident management and response in the event of a transportation security 
incident. 
Under GreenLane and SAFE Ports, local, state, federal, port authority and private 
sector stakeholders are identified as participants at each joint operations center.  See 








Table 6. Designated Joint Operations Center Participants (From: SAFE Ports 
 
Private sector entities 




Port AuthorityFederal Bureau of 
Investigation 
State, local and 
international law 
enforcement
Bureau of Immigration 
and Customs 
Enforcement 
Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection 
U.S. Coast Guard 
 
 
The similarities between SeaHawk and the GreenLane and SAFE Ports Bills are 
evident.  Lessons learned from SeaHawk apply to the Joint Operations Centers as well as 
the ongoing transformation of Coast Guard Sector Command Centers (SCCs) located 
nationwide. 
 
E.  KEY ATTRIBUTES OF THE SEAHAWK MODEL 
SeaHawk occupies a distinct and vital niche in our country’s evolving system of 
homeland security.  Intermodal port security crosses many traditional boundaries of 
organization and jurisdiction.  SeaHawk pursues port security from a holistic approach by 
engaging all relevant partners.  In doing so, collaboration, information sharing and threat 
recognition necessary for effective port security are enhanced.   
As a key transportation hub, the economic reach of the Port of Charleston extends 
well beyond the waterfront.  The Port of Charleston is the busiest container port in the 
Southeast and Gulf coastal region with 1.98 million TEUs and 727,000 tons of breakbulk 
cargo flowing through the port in 2005.  Seven hundred companies from every South 
Carolina county ship through Charleston as do shippers in two dozen states who use 







                                                
countries.  Forty steamship lines and two tug companies ply the waters of the port.  
Norfolk Southern and CSX connect the port to the country via rail while 131 truck lines 
move cargo to and from the port via interstate highway.  Trade generates $23 billion for 
the state economy and more than 281,000 South Carolinians have jobs connected to the 
port.63   
The challenge of securing a high-value, high-velocity port such as Charleston is 
significant.  The SeaHawk model synchronizes homeland security activities by 
employing a risk-based analysis of shared information (e.g. Advance Notice of Arrival 
crew, vessel and cargo data).  Organizationally, SeaHawk relies on a Unified Command 
(UC) consisting of Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security (Coast 
Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement) 
leaders.  Members of the UC meet and jointly review an Intelligence Section product that 
analyzes forecasted port operations.  The UC discusses risk, shares their organizational 
perspectives and develops an appropriate action plan.  These decisions become the 
marching orders for the task force officers (TFOs) assigned to SeaHawk.  TFOs bring 
detailed local knowledge gained through years of law enforcement.  TFOs operate as part 
of joint teams that, like the UC, leverage the unique perspectives of the various 
participating agencies.64   
SeaHawk has successfully institutionalized information and intelligence sharing.  
As a result, port security decision making and operations are conceived and executed 
from a broader and informed point of view than when agencies operate independently.  
Scarce resources are also more effectively employed.  The coordinating efforts of the UC 
have largely eliminated the occurrences of redundant government operations.  No longer, 
for example, are federal, state and local law enforcement bumping into each other at the 
brow of a merchant ship.  Rather, operations are synchronized.  Likewise equipment is 
shared more effectively.  A single Coast Guard patrol boat may, for example, deliver a 
 
63 South Carolina State Ports Authority, 2006, "Fact Sheet," http://www.port-of-
charleston.com/about_the_port/statistics/statistics.asp/ (accessed March 16, 2006). 




                                                
multi-agency task force to conduct an at-sea boarding leaving other law enforcement 
boats to conduct patrols or board other vessels. 
Fundamental to the advances in coordination and information sharing achieved by 
SeaHawk is the financial support from Congress.  Between fiscal year 2003 and 2004 
almost $40 million was authorized.  These funds were used to bring participating 
agencies together under one roof thus facilitating direct interaction; to develop the 
information architecture that enhances collaboration; to install sensors in the port to 
improve situational awareness; and to pay salaries of task force officers.     
The SeaHawk strategic approach to achieving port security is rare in that it not 
only looks to deter attack via aggressive law enforcement operations but also seeks to 
prevent attack by analyzing criminal activities that may serve as precursors to terrorist 
activity.65  This distinguishes SeaHawk from both the JTTF and the Area Maritime 
Security Committee.  The JTTF co-located with SeaHawk has but a fraction of 
SeaHawk’s manpower and is strictly focused on investigating terrorist activity. The Area 
Maritime Security Committee focuses on port vulnerabilities and mitigation plans.  
SeaHawk personnel investigate criminal activity in and around the port for evidence of 
emerging terrorist capabilities.  In doing so SeaHawk seeks to address the reality that a 
port attack is possible from a variety of vectors (i.e. road, rail and air) vice solely from 
the sea and that “bad guys” already in the U.S. may be involved in criminal activity 
linked to prospective terrorist activity. 
 
F. OSINT AND MDA AT SEAHAWK 
The Intelligence Section at SeaHawk consists of a section chief and five analysts 
complemented by two Coast Guard intelligence analysts.  Together these personnel 
develop an overall threat analysis for the Unified Command focused on maritime 
operations in the port.  OSINT is used to supplement classified intelligence.  The OSINT 
collection process involves the utilization of both subscription and non-subscription open 
sources.  SeaHawk uses Maritime Intelligence Group’s proprietary service that assesses 
 




                                                
the global merchant fleet for terrorism risk and Lloyds Marine Intelligence Unit, which 
provides information on the vessels, companies, ports and people in the merchant 
industry.  Lloyd’s Seasearcher provides information on the movements of vessels greater 
than 99 gross tons.  Data is culled to examine those bound for Charleston.  A key non-
subscription open source used is the South Carolina State Ports Authority web page 
which provides information spanning forty days of operations.  Commercial vessels 
currently docked, vessels expected in the next 30 days and vessels that visited in the past 
10 days are listed.  Data fields included vessel name, agent, length over all, terminal, 
berth number, expected arrival date and cargo.66  Local newspapers also contain a list of 
ships scheduled to arrive in port.  SeaHawk analysts use this information as a 
complement to that received in accordance with regulations requiring vessels 300 gross 
tons and larger entering U.S. waters from a foreign port give a 96-Hour Advance Notice 
of Arrival.67 The port authority information allows SeaHawk to expand their planning 
horizon by an additional 26 days.   This is especially useful when foreign ships are 
transiting from one US port to another US port. Analysts use the port authority 
information, for example, to investigate vessel ownership to deduce who is really 
operating and controlling vessels. 
SeaHawk’s collection and analysis of open sources related to the other 
transportation modes is nascent.  Container shipments are illustrative.  A single ship may 
deliver 3000 containers.  Those containers depart the port via both road and rail.  A truck 
typically carries a single container while several hundred may depart via rail at one time.  
Reverse the scenario for exports and you have potentially thousands of truck deliveries 
and multiple rail shipments to fill one departing container ship with exports.  The number 
 
66 South Carolina State Ports Authority, 2006, "Vessel Schedule," http://www.port-of-
charleston.com/vessel_schedule.asp/ (accessed April 8, 2006). 
67 There are some exceptions to the 96 hour notification requirement.  For example, a vessel on a 
voyage of less than 24 hours from one United States port to another United States port only need report 
before departing the port or place of departure.  Recreational vessels are also exempted. For a 
comprehensive list of exemptions and additional explanation, see Title 33 Part 160, Subpart C- 
Notifications of Arrivals, Departures, Hazardous Conditions, and Certain Dangerous Cargoes 
http://www.washingtonwatchdog.org/documents/cfr/title33/part160.html#160.201 and the NVMC web site. 
USCG National Vessel Movement Center, 2006, "FAQ," http://www.nvmc.uscg.gov/index.html. (accessed 




                                                
of personnel directly involved with the rail and road modes- truck drivers, rail personnel, 
employees for each truck and rail line- is far greater than in the maritime mode where the 
typical ship has a crew of 25-30.  Without efficient and effective data mining techniques 
for the collection, fusion and analysis of open sources associated with the road and rail 
modes (e.g.  background checks of carrier ownership and the personnel that expect to 
enter a port; detection of anomalous truck and rail movements), a full appraisal of the 
threat to the port is difficult if not impossible. 
Media scanning (i.e. maintaining awareness of online, print and televised media) 
is another form of open source collection and is conducted in an ongoing basis by a 
variety of SeaHawk personnel including senior management and intelligence unit 
personnel.  The objective is to identity information relevant to SeaHawk.  Local and 
national media sources raised awareness of organized crime elements and trends that 
could potentially impact the port of Charleston.  Some examples include the following: 
• When a local television station reported that seven MS-13 members were 
arrested in the small town of Orangeburg, personnel at SeaHawk took 
notice.68  The gang was previously known to be in Columbia, which is 115 
miles from the port of Charleston, but what was it that propelled MS-13 to 
locate in a quiet suburban enclave just 80 minutes from the port?  
• A Wall Street Journal article regarding immigration had an accompanying 
chart that broke out the geographic origin of the estimated 10 million plus 
illegal immigrants.  That 81 percent of the illegal immigrants came from 
Mexico and Latin America was not unexpected.  What was noteworthy was 
that more than 400,000 come from “Africa and elsewhere.”69  Unlike 
migrants from Mexico that walk across the border, the “Africans and 
elsewhere” group  
 
 
68 Jennifer Miskewicz, "Orangeburg Officers Arrest Members Of Notorious MS-13 Gang," Wistv.com, 
March 1, 2006, http://wistv.com/Global/story.asp?S=4571356/  (accessed April 9, 2006). 
69 June Kronholz, "Senate To Weigh Immigration Overhaul," The Wall Street Journal Online, March 




                                                
 
are likely to use a maritime route that may well take them into east coast ports.  
SeaHawk personnel wanted to know if Charleston was one of those entry 
ports.   
The basis for media scanning is prompted by the desire for enhanced situational 
awareness and the understanding that terrorist related activity in the region is not an 
abstract concern.  In 2003 Mohamad Hammoud and five others were sentenced for 
material support to Hezbollah.  Hammoud, the leader of the Charlotte cell, received 155 
years for his part in wide-ranging criminal activity that raised funds for the Iranian-
backed terrorist organization.70  Beyond highlighting the presence of a terrorist cell, the 
significance of the Charlotte case is that it effectively demonstrated that a nexus between 
crime and terrorism exists such that criminal activity is a fundamental attribute of 
terrorist organizations operating in the United States. 
 
G. FINDINGS 
SeaHawk is aligned with The National Strategy for Maritime Security.  Indeed, 
SeaHawk may well represent the most robust current model for port security.  
Congressional support and resources facilitated the establishment of this multi-agency 
organization which effectively demonstrates unity of command and unity of effort.  
SeaHawk exploits open sources to develop situational awareness that extends well 
beyond the waterfront because it is understood that criminal activity that could affect port 
security does not begin and end in Charleston harbor.  However, for all of its strengths 
SeaHawk is only marginally effective in exploiting available open sources.  The current 
methods of collecting, fusing, analyzing and disseminating OSINT are incomplete.  The 
primary area of emphasis with regard to OSINT remains the maritime mode of 
transportation with little if any systematic exploitation of open sources related to the non-
maritime modes of transportation. There is no means of integrating OSINT into the 
operating picture.  As a result analysis and distribution of OSINT is currently limited to  
 
70 David E. Kaplan, "Homegrown Terrorists," USNews.com, March 10, 2003, 





verbally delivered briefs and email and, in the near future, postings to the Intelligence 
portion of the SeaHawk portal.  OSINT distribution channels are no more advanced than 
those found elsewhere in government.    
  Personnel at SeaHawk recognize that open sources offer a valuable stream of data 
and information to better understand the threat, improve situational awareness and 
achieve enhanced port security.  Although there are interim measures that may be taken 
to leverage existing technology and better exploit open sources (e.g internet news 
aggregators reduce some of the collection burden associated with media scanning), it is 
unlikely that the benefits of a robust OSINT program will be fully realized.  Why? The 
absence of an overarching domestic OSINT program has effectively shifted the burden of 
developing and executing policy, strategy and tactics to this field level organization.  
SeaHawk does not have the resources to fully develop OSINT in support of local port 
security efforts.  If the government’s arguably best resourced port security organization 
cannot maximize OSINT inputs to achieve enhanced awareness, what are the 
























                                                
IV. A STRATEGY TO IMPROVE PORT SECURITY  
 
A. INTERMODAL PORTS: KEY TRADE HUBS 
United States prosperity and international trade are unalterably linked.  A robust 
economy relies on efficient commerce.  Ports are key hubs in the international trade 
network, connecting foreign and domestic purchasers and suppliers.  More than 80 
percent of global trade by volume is moved by ships at sea with the United States 
accounting for nearly 20 percent of global maritime trade activity.”71  International 
container shipments via U.S. ports are forecasted to more than double between 2001 and 
2020.72  The top twenty U.S. ports have already realized 43 percent growth in this key 
trade segment.  See Table 7.   
In addition to connecting the United States to the rest of the world, ports are also 
key domestic intermodal hubs.  Norfolk Southern, one of two class one railroads serving 
the Port of Charleston, SC is a striking example.73  Of the containers handled by Norfolk 
Southern, 45 percent are shipped to or from East Coast ports like the Port of Charleston, 







71 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Maritime Commerce Security Plan," (October 2005), 2-3, 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0608.xml/ (accessed May 10, 2006). 
72 U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, “Report to Congress on the 
Performance of Ports and the Intermodal System”, v, June 2005, 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/publications/05%20reports/Report%20to%20Congress-
Ports%20%20Intermodal%20Efficiency%206-21-05%20final.pdf (accessed May 30, 2006). 
73 Class I Railraods are line haul freight railroads with operating revenues in excess of $289.4 million. 
Association of American Railroads, “Overview of U.S. Freight Railroads”,  May 11,2006,  
http://www.aar.org/PubCommon/Documents/AboutTheIndustry/Overview.pdf (accessed July 19, 2006). 
74 Dan McCue, "Flood Of Inports Causes Railroad To Haul In New Concepts," Charleston Regional 
Business Journal, April 3, 2006, http://www.charlestonbusiness.com/ (accessed April 8, 2006). 
Table 7. Container Trade From 2001-2005. (After: Port Inport Export Reporting) 
 
Rank U.S. Custom Ports Growth TEUs from 2001-2005 
1 Los Angeles, CA 41.9% 
2 Long Beach, CA 37.0% 
3 New York, NY 43.8% 
4 Charleston, SC 30.2% 
5 Savannah, GA 80.7% 
6 Oakland, CA 42.6% 
7 Seattle, WA 62.5% 
8 Norfolk, VA 48.9% 
9 Houston, TX 55.9% 
10 Tacoma, WA 88.7% 




13 Baltimore, MD 39.6% 
14 San Juan, PR 41.8% 
15 Gulfport, MS 14.5% 
16 New Orleans, LA * -19.9% 
17 Wilmington, DE 26.2% 
18 
West Palm Beach, 
FL 33.9% 
19 Philadelphia, PA 89.8% 
20 Jacksonville, FL 39.4% 
Cumulative Growth top 20 ports:   43.4% 
* New Orleans growth slipped due to Hurricane Katrina. 
 
From 2001-2004 New Orleans registered 12% growth. 
Modern ports are intermodal facilities.  Truck, rail, ocean carrier and sometimes 
air transportation converge at ports, ports that compete with each other to a great extent 
on their ability to serve as efficient intermodal hubs.  A review of several port authority 








                                                
• Port of New Orleans, LA 
o Rail: 6 class one railroads service the port 
o Truck: 75 truck lines serve the port 
o Maritime: container, breakbulk, and cruise terminals; access to 
14,500 miles of inland waterway system 
 
• Port of Charleston, SC 
o Rail: 2 class one railroads 
o Truck: 131 truck lines 
o Maritime: container, auto/RO-RO, breakbulk cargo and cruise 
terminals 
 
• Boston, MA (MASSPORT) 
o Rail: transfer facility 
o Truck: 82 truck lines 
o Maritime: container, auto/RO-RO, LNG, bulk cargo and cruise 
terminals 
o Air: Logan Airport 
 
New Orleans, Charleston and Boston demonstrate that the intermodal connectivity 
that transpires at ports is fundamental to the movement of goods across the international 
supply chain. A key challenge implicit to port operations is synchronizing modal 
operations to avoid bottlenecks.  Congestion at ports is a top industry concern.75  Ports 
must have not only efficient waterside but also landside, i.e. rail and truck, connections.76  








75 U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, “Report to Congress on the 
Performance of Ports and the Intermodal System”, 24, June 2005, 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/publications/05%20reports/Report%20to%20Congress-
Ports%20%20Intermodal%20Efficiency%206-21-05%20final.pdf (accessed May 30, 2006). 
76 Ibid., 3. 
 
Figure 2.   Intermodal Port Cargo Flows 
 
The convergence of transportation modes reveals the challenge of securing ports.  
The September 11, 2001 attacks provided a vivid example of how the transportation 
system can be exploited by our adversaries.  The system of international trade, therefore, 
must not only be efficient, but secure.77   All components of the intermodal system- 
waterside, port/terminal intermodal interface, and landside movements- need to be 
considered in terms of a holistic port security system. 
The Maritime Commerce Security Plan (MCSP) outlines a framework to protect 
the maritime component of the international supply chain against the terrorist threat.  The 
plan, in recognition of the volume and velocity of trade and the twin objectives of 
                                                 
77 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australian Government, Economic Analytical Unit, 








                                                
security and free flowing commerce, is centered on risk management.  Reliable 
information and intelligence is needed to evaluate threats and assess risks.78  A key 
recommendation of the plan is to improve the security of the domestic intermodal supply 
chain that connects the nation to the maritime transportation system.79  Ports, as key hubs 
in the domestic and international supply chain network, warrant particular attention.  
Intelligence and information relevant to the ports, therefore, is key to effective risk 
management.  A more robust OSINT program, one that fully exploits intermodal data 
sources, has the potential to improve MDA and to  strengthen risk based decision making, 
thus improving port security. 
 
B. THE GAP 
The Maritime Commerce Security Plan and the National Plan to Achieve 
Maritime Domain Awareness are both supporting plans to the National Strategy for 
Maritime Security.  Both plans share a common interest in the security of ports which are 
a component of the Maritime Domain.80  The goal of Maritime Domain Awareness is to 
aid maritime security decision makers in attaining “decision superiority in the maritime 
domain.” 81   Maritime Sentinel- The Coast Guard Strategic Plan for Combating 
Maritime Terrorism states that the success of the Combating Maritime Terrorism (CMT) 
mission depends upon MDA.82     
 
78 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Maritime Commerce Security Plan," (October 2005), 1. 
79 Ibid., 19. 
80 The Maritime Domain is defined as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to or 
bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, 
infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.”  U.S. President, "National Security 
Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13 (Maritime Security 
Policy),” 2, December 21, 2004, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf (accessed November 6, 
2005). 
81 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Plan To Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness," 
8, October, 2005, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf (accessed November 6, 
2005). 
82 Thomas H. Collins, Maritime Sentinel- Coast Guard Strategic Plan For Combating Maritime 
Terrorism (U.S. Coast Guard, 2005), 25, https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/infra/nps23-031606-01.pdf. 




                                                
A strategic objective of the CMT mission is to “protect U.S. population centers, 
critical infrastructure, key resources, transportation systems, borders, harbors, ports and 
coastal approaches to the maritime domain.”83  When it comes to securing intermodal 
ports, MDA is essential.  However, in its current stage of development MDA largely 
looks to the sea and in doing so, overlooks threats to ports that originate on land.   
Although Maritime Sentinel does call for “comprehensive domain awareness…of ports” 
it offers little detail on the strategy to achieve it. 84  Maritime Sentinel is silent on the 
means to assess the risk posed by rail and road transportation links in intermodal ports.  
As a result, decision makers responsible for port security are not fully supported with the 
data, information and intelligence needed to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment, 
one that views an intermodal port as a system of systems. 
 
C. 360° PORT MDA – A HOLISTIC SECURITY APPROACH 
Comprehensive domain awareness is needed to support decision makers 
responsible for the security of intermodal ports.   The Maritime Commerce Security Plan 
highlights this need.  It states that Federal Government will identify actions to improve 
the security of the domestic intermodal supply chain that connects the nation to the 
Maritime Domain.  The collection, fusion, analysis, and dissemination of public and 
private sector open source information related to each mode of transportation that 
converges at the port is needed to provide decision makers with comprehensive domain 
awareness, or 360° Port MDA.   360° Port MDA would enable a more holistic 
understanding of risk at intermodal ports and facilitate improved risk-based decision 
making.   
 
D. WHY IS 360° PORT MDA FUNDAMENTAL TO THE COAST GUARD? 
 360° Port MDA is conceptually aligned with the National Strategy for Maritime 
Security, the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security and Maritime 
 
83Thomas H. Collins, Maritime Sentinel- Coast Guard Strategic Plan For Combating Maritime 
Terrorism (U.S. Coast Guard, 2005), 8, https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/infra/nps23-031606-01.pdf. 
(accessed May 10, 2006).  




                                                
Sentinel- The Coast Guard Strategic Plan for Combating Maritime Terrorism. The Coast 
Guard is the lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security and a key player in the 
ongoing efforts to develop Maritime Domain Awareness.  Coast Guard Captains of the 
Port are responsible for enforcing port safety and security in their area of responsibility.   
 As a member of the Intelligence Community, the Coast Guard possesses existing 
capabilities and relationships needed to lead the development of an OSINT program 
fundamental to the attainment of 360° Port MDA.  Furthermore, as a member of the 
Department of Homeland Security and a former member of the Department of 
Transportation, the Coast Guard has the ability to leverage current and former 
partnerships in the pursuit of 360° Port MDA. 
 360° Port MDA falls squarely within the purview and responsibilities of the Coast 
Guard. 
 
E. WHAT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS 360° PORT MDA? 
National prosperity depends on free flowing commerce.  Growth in international 
trade and intermodal transportation has elevated the importance of ports.  The 9/11 
Commission issued a cautionary note concerning the security of ports: 
“While commercial aviation remains a possible target, terrorists may turn their 
attention to other modes.  Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or 
surface transportation.” 85  Israel provided an unfortunate case in point when on March 
14, 2004 Hamas and al –Aqsa Martyrs Brigade suicide bombers attacked the Israeli port 
of Ashdod.  One bomber detonated himself outside of the main gate while the other blew 
himself up in a port workshop.86  This event demonstrated the vulnerability of the port to 
an attack originating from the landside. 
Port of Seattle CEO Mic Dinsmore emphasized domestic port security concerns in 
his testimony to the U.S. Senate:  
 
85 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, by Thomas H. Kean, Chairman (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 391. 
86 Mark Willacy, "Israel Says Bombers Attempting 'Mega-terrorist Attack'," ABC Online, March 15, 




                                                
“It has been almost five years since the attacks of 9/11, and I must say that I do 
not sleep well knowing all the vulnerabilities in our port security system…the controls 
we have for allowing persons to get onto our marine terminals are almost embarrassing.” 
87  Senator Susan Collins, chair of the Committee on Homeland Security, remarked, 
“America’s cargo ports, large and small, are on the frontlines of the war against 
terrorism.” 88   
Port Hueneme was closed for four hours and the motor vessel Wild Lotus 
evacuated when longshoremen unloading the ship found a threatening 
message in the cargo hold.89  The port is the only deep water harbor 
between Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay area, is the top seaport in 
the United States for citrus export and ranks among the top ten ports in the 
country for automobile and banana imports.90  The incident highlights that 
even the threat of an attack must be taken seriously which, in turn, may 
disrupt port operations. 
 Much emphasis has been placed on preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons 
from entering U.S. ports from abroad.  The Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the 
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) are two examples.91  Relatively 
little emphasis has been placed on reducing the risk to ports posed by an attack 
originating domestically.  It wasn’t until January 2006 that the Transportation Security 
Administration created the Intermodal Risk Management Program to coordinate threat 





87 Brad Knickerbocker, "Smugglers Exploit Hole In Port Security," The Christian Science Monitor, 
April 11, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/ (accessed April 13, 2006). 
88 Ibid. 
89 VenturaCountyStar.com, “U.S. Continues Investigation into Incident at Port of Hueneme,” June 28, 
2006, http://www.venturacountystar.com/vcs/county_news/article/0,1375,VCS_226_4807321,00.html 
(accessed June 29, 2006). 
90 Port of Hueneme, http://www.portofhueneme.org/ (accessed June 29, 2006) 
91 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Securing U.S. Ports," CBP.gov, April 25, 2006, 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/trade/securing_us_ports.xml/ (accessed May 8, 2006). 
92 Beth Dickey, "Rethinking TSA," Government Executive, May 1, 2006, 18. 
F. WHAT VALUE DOES 360° PORT MDA REPRESENT? 
 The Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid is an analytical tool used to map the 
actions needed to create new value.93   The grid shows that costs may be reduced and 
new public value created by adopting a strategy of 360° Port MDA.  See Table 8. 
 
Table 8. 360° Port MDA Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid 
 
Eliminate:
• Intermodal security seam at 
maritime ports
Raise:
• Improved OSINT via exploitation 
of open sources related to 
intermodal port operations
• Greater coordination between 
Federal agencies 
• Greater awareness of threat 
vectors to intermodal ports
• Improved Situational Awareness 
and more informed Risk-Based 
Decision Making
Reduce:
• Risk of attack on ports 
• Deployment of scarce resources 
to low-risk activities
• Risk premium of shipping via U.S. 
ports
• Inefficiencies / economic friction 
due to poorly synchronized 
government security 
Create:
• Greater public 
certainty/confidence by 
“connecting the (intermodal) dots”
• Greater synergy between DHS 
agencies (CG, CBP, ICE, TSA), 
Federal, State and Local entities 






                                                 
93 W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space 







                                                
G. WHAT INITIATIVES ARE NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT 360° PORT 
MDA? 
Unity of Effort: The Department of Homeland Security has a fundamental 
interest in the security of intermodal ports. The Coast Guard, CBP, ICE and TSA all play 
key roles.  Improved federal coordination coupled with effective partnerships with State, 
Local and private sector entities is needed to meet the security challenges represented by 
high velocity intermodal ports.  The Coast Guard, in its capacity as lead federal agency 
for maritime homeland security, should lead the national effort to develop 360° Port 
MDA.  In doing so the challenge of improved security must be pursued with full 
consideration of the need to not impede, but rather, facilitate free flowing trade.   
Revise the MDA Essential Task List: A concept fundamental to MDA is 
persistent monitoring of vessels and craft; cargo; and vessel crews and passengers.  A 
parallel essential task list needs to be extended to the other modes that operate at ports.  
Aggressive efforts are needed to leverage the data gathered via the Transportation 
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program to screen ground and rail personnel 
entering a port.  Improved cargo visibility, as suggested with a National Intelligent 
Freight Network, is needed to understand and anticipate possible risks to the port.94  
Use Intermodal Data: More aggressive exploration of proprietary intermodal data 
is also needed to achieve 360° Port MDA.  Partnering with leading industry groups such 
as the Intermodal Association of North America (IANA) and the American Association 
of Ports Authorities (AAPA) would provide insights regarding the availability of 
proprietary data sources from their members.   
Amend the SAFE Port ACT:  The key outcomes of developing 360° Port MDA 
are to improve security while reducing government introduced friction.  The full benefit 
of improved MDA will only be realized if joint operations centers as practiced at 
SeaHawk in the Port of Charleston and proposed in the SAFE Port Act are adopted.  The 
SAFE Port Act needs to be amended, however, to include TSA in the list of agencies 
 
94 U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, “Report to Congress on the 
Performance of Ports and the Intermodal System”, 45, June, 2005, 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/publications/05%20reports/Report%20to%20Congress-
Ports%20%20Intermodal%20Efficiency%206-21-05%20final.pdf (accessed May 30, 2006). 
expected to participate in the joint operations centers.  Intermodal risk assessment is 
essential to fully informed risk based decision making (RBDM).  Including TSA will 
contribute to developing an intermodal perspective.  The Department of Transportation 
and the Maritime Administration also need to be consulted directly to ensure 
understanding of developments relevant to the national intermodal system and access to 
data needed to improve MDA and RBDM. 
 A case in point is CSX Intermodal, a rail carrier providing door-to-door delivery 
via intermodal operations.  CSX Intermodal touts its web-based shipment tracking 
capability as well as its 48 terminal network used in serving major U.S. ports.  See Figure 
3.  CSX Intermodal possesses data that would be useful in gaining improved visibility of 
cargo and personnel (i.e. truck drivers, rail crews) destined for U.S. ports.  GreenLane 
type processing of intermodal cargo delivered to U.S. ports should be used as an 
incentive to encourage ports and their partners to share proprietary data. 
 
 










                                                
H. WHY IS 360° PORT MDA IMPORTANT? 
Security at ports needs to be fashioned with an understanding of the national 
intermodal system that converges at ports.  Market-based forces driven by globalization 
are exerting tremendous pressure on ports to efficiently handle cargo.  360° Port MDA 
creates public value by enabling more fully informed risk-based decision making.  In 
doing so security at vital intermodal ports will improve, the risk of terrorist attack or 
illegal activity decrease and the free flow of commerce will be facilitated.  Improved 
security will foster a sense of stability- favored by investors and businesses- and a 
reduced perception of risk thus creating economic value.  
360° Port MDA rests on a foundation of effective OSINT.  Building an effective 
OSINT program involves a fundamental decision regarding the merits of centralization 
versus decentralization.  In other words, should the OSINT process take place at the 
national level or at the local/port level?  One approach is to leverage the efficiency of a 
national effort with the strengths of a decentralized (i.e. port unique) process.  Nation-
wide policy and standards as well as open source collection and data fusion would occur 
at the national level in order to avoid redundant and costly efforts at each port.  For 
example, purchases of proprietary rail and ground data would occur at the national level. 
The fused data would then be made available to local port intelligence analysts- such as 
SeaHawk’s intelligence section and Coast Guard Field Intelligence Support Teams- who 
would focus their efforts on analysis and delivery of products that support intermodal risk 
assessment by local decision makers.  The local level analysts would also report to the 
national level information useful in developing regional and national awareness. 
The following Logic Model provides an analysis of the inputs, outputs and 




95 Harry P. Hatry, Performance Management: Getting Results (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute 





Table 9.           Logic Model for 360° Port MDA 
 
Both National and 
Local
Local LevelNational Level
Free flowing trade at 
ports
Reduced risk
Improved Port Security--Data mining     
and Analysis
IT infrastructure
End Outcomes:--Data fusionTraining (Intelligence 
staff and decision 
makers)
Improved RBDM--Open source    
Collection
360° Port MDA--Dissemination of  
products/reports 
that support local 
RBDM and 




















I. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
(SWOC) ANALYSIS 
 A SWOC Analysis highlighted several key issues to be addressed in pursuing a 
strategy to achieve 360° Port MDA.  First, despite the rise in prominence of port security 
caused by foreign management of U.S. ports (e.g. Dubai Ports World’s interest in five 
major ports), pressing political issues such as illegal migration at land borders and a tight 
federal budget will constrain new Congressional funding for 360° Port MDA.  A 
requirement to pursue 360° Port MDA needs to be added to the SAFE Ports / GreenLane 
Bills to leverage existing support and resources.  Second, TSA and DOT need to be 
encouraged to participate in order to draw on their intermodal expertise and exploit 
available government data sources.  Third, expanding the view of MDA from maritime 
centric to one that also considers intermodal activities may well spur bureaucratic turf 
protection.  Overall, the fit between Coast Guard and the broader environment is good, 
but challenges to implementing 360° Port MDA do exist.  See Table 10.   
Table 10. SWOC for the U.S. Coast Guard as lead agency for 360° Port MDA 
Need to bring TSA and DOT 
to the port security table.
Improve security without 
introducing economic 
“friction” and new costs at the 
port.
DOJ/FBI could oppose 
broader view of MDA as 
encroachment on their turf.
Coast Guard has a strong reputation 
and is widely viewed as high 
performing.
Political/popular concern over 
government information 
collection.
Connect the intermodal dots.
MDA is already a substantial 
undertaking, this initiative 
broadens it still.
Partnerships with CPB and TSA.Organizational focus has shifted 
to Natural Disasters due to 
Hurricane Katrina.
Gaining access to proprietary 
commercial may be difficult 
and costly.
SeaHawk provides a proven model 
for multiagency port security and 
RBDM. 
Ability to act on MDA requires 
strong collaboration with non-
traditional fed/state/local partners.
Good relationships with maritime 
law enforcement community 
(fed/state/local).
Resource constraints: Federal 
budget deficits limit new 
starts and associated FTE.
Public & Political interest in Port 
Security is high in the wake of 
Dubai Ports World issue.  SAFE 
Port and Green Lane Bills address 
port security.
Lack of understanding of threat 
posed by non-maritime 
intermodal operations in ports.
Extensive organizational 
knowledge of ports and strong 
relationships with private sector 
port partners.
IT system is a critical 
component, but could be 
costly
Government sources of intermodal
data.
Field intelligence staff is limited 
in number and may be unable to 
take on a new task.
CG intelligence Program is 









J. BENCHMARKING  
360° Port MDA requires both National and Local level efforts to exploit OSINT.  
Benchmarking key organizations at both the National and Local level would provide 
insights on the state of the art of open source collection, fusion and analysis as well as 
port security focused risk-based decision making.  Benchmarking would also help 
identify opportunities to improve exploitation of intermodal open sources.  The Director 
of National Intelligence’s Open Source Center (OSC), the Coast Guard’s Intelligence 
Coordination Center (ICC) and the Charleston Harbor Operations Center (Project 
SeaHawk) should be studied.   
 OSC is the Intelligence Community’s premier OSINT organization, and ICC the 
Coast Guard’s central MDA intelligence hub connecting national and port-level MDA 
information flows.  SeaHawk employs a unique approach to port security organization 
and an advanced IT infrastructure supporting a participative, multi-agency RBDM 
process. 
Table 11 summarizes the benchmarking plan to support the development of 
360°Port MDA: 
 SUBJECT ORGANIZATION DATA TYPE 








OSC Process Map Cross-agency team 
Open Source Data 
Fusion 
OSC Process Map Cross-agency team 
Open Source Data 
Mining & Analysis 
ICC/OSC Training Plans Cross-agency team 
Open Source 
Dissemination 
ICC/ OSC Samples for various 
media (print, video, 
audio) 
Cross-agency team 









                                                
Benchmarking should be conducted by a cross-agency Implementation Team 
consisting of Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, TSA, DOT and DOJ personnel with backgrounds 
in intelligence, risk management, intermodal operations, port security and information 
system design.  Results should be presented to the Coast Guard MDA Program 
Integration Office, the Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal 
Investigations, the Director of SeaHawk  and the Captain of the Port of Charleston. 
 
K. DRIVING THE STRATEGY TO ATTAIN 360° PORT MDA 
Implementing a strategy of 360° Port MDA Security requires surmounting key 
organizational hurdles quickly and at low cost via “tipping point leadership.”  Tipping 
point leadership applies concentrated effort to select people, acts and activities to create 
the leverage needed to align an organization and move a strategy from concept to 
reality.96      
An expansion of an existing pilot program, Project SeaHawk, will be the basis for 
the following discussion as lessons learned at SeaHawk in terms of 360° Port MDA will 
be applicable to the development of the Joint Operations Centers proposed in the SAFE 
Port Act.  If passed, the SAFE Port Act will require the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to “expand existing and establish new joint operations centers for maritime and cargo 
security to (1) enhance information sharing; (2) facilitate day-to-day operational 
coordination; and (3) in the case of a transportation security incident, facilitate incident 
management and response.”97   
There are four primary organizational hurdles to address: political, cognitive, 
resource and motivational.  
 
96 W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 
2005), 148-151. 
97 House, A Bill to Improve Maritime And Cargo Security Through Enhanced Layered Defenses, And 
For Other Purposes, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2006, H.R. 4954, Sec. 15, Government Printing Office, March 
14, 2006, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=h4954ih.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/109_cong_bil
ls  (accessed May 25, 2006). 
1. The Political Hurdle
By far the Political Hurdle is the most significant challenge to overcome in 
pursuit of 360° Port MDA.  The stakeholder analysis below identifies key parties in terms 
of Interest and Power.  See Table 12.  Efforts to engender political support should begin 
with a brief to the Director of SeaHawk. Subsequent briefs should be made to the Coast 
Guard Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal Investigations and the Coast 
Guard Maritime Domain Awareness Program Integration Office.  
 






















•Industry- supply chain participants 













                                                 
98 John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations 3rd Edition (San 







                                                
2. The Cognitive Hurdle 
This barrier can be simply explained as “Seeing is Believing.”  In order to drive 
home the importance of developing 360° Port MDA, an Implementation Team should be 
designated by United States Coast Guard MDA Program Integration Office.  The team 
should start work by visiting the ports of LA/Long Beach, New York, Houston and 
Charleston.  These visits will be used to highlight to team members the scope of 
intermodal operations and the associated security challenges.  Focus group meetings 
should be held in these key ports with the Captain of the Port and Area Maritime Security 
Committee members to discuss anticipated trade growth and current/prospective steps to 
build 360° Port MDA.  The relevant Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils should also be 
consulted.  Insights gleaned from visits to these high-volume trade ports will be used in 
shaping actions to develop 360° Port MDA at the Port of Charleston. 
 
3. The Resource Hurdle 
The Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard Intelligence Directorate 
(CG-2) and the Coast Guard  Maritime Domain Awareness Program Integration Office 
(G-XM) should identify resources to support the initial development of 360° Port MDA.  
Collection and fusion of relevant open sources is likely to be a primary cost driver.  
These processes should occur at the national level in order to realize economies of scale.  
This would be consistent with ongoing efforts to centralize requirements for vessel 
targeting and decision support.99  The IT infrastructure currently used at SeaHawk to 
support RBDM should be expanded to include analysis of intermodal data sources.  
Lessons learned regarding the cost of implementation at SeaHawk should be used to 




99 United States Coast Guard Commandant, Commercial Data Sources to Support Vessel Screening, e-
mail message ALCOAST 050/06, 262118Z January 2006. 
100 The SAFE port Act authorizes $100,000,000 for joint operations centers to be appropriated for 
each fiscal year from 2007 through 2012.  House, A Bill to Improve Maritime And Cargo Security Through 




4. The Motivational Hurdle
Captains of the Port and Port Authorities are key actors at the port level and 
represent the nexus of security and commercial interests.  As a Department of Justice 
pilot program, the Director of SeaHawk represents another key participant.  It is essential 
that these parties- the Captain of the Port of Charleston, the Chairman of the South 
Carolina State Ports Authority and the Director of SeaHawk- become engaged in the 
implementation of 360° Port MDA.  Requesting them to serve as the local guidance team 
and to provide a DHS led oversight committee comprised of key stakeholders (e.g. 
USCG, CPB, ICE, TSA, DOJ, American Association of Port Authorities) with feedback 
on progress made in attaining 360° Port MDA would be valuable.   
 
L. FINDINGS 
Security gaps in the maritime transportations system remain, resulting in 
high-risk container systems not being checked overseas or domestically 
and ports that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  
SAFE Port Act, Sec. 2. 
 
The Department of Homeland Security and the Departments of Commerce 
and Transportation will identify short and long term actions to improve the 
security of the domestic intermodal supply chain that connects the nation 
to the maritime domain. 
National Strategy for Maritime Security: Maritime Commerce Security 
Plan 
Port security continues to evolve to meet the challenge of attaining improved 
security while simultaneously facilitating the free flow of commerce.  The Coast Guard 
does not have a formal OSINT program and the Department of Homeland Security’s 
OSINT program is in the earliest stages of development.  An integrated OSINT program, 
one that fully leverages proprietary open sources, has the potential to make a significant 






360° Port MDA may be summarized by a series of if-then statements as follows: 
• If opens sources related to intermodal activities in U.S. ports are exploited, 
then Port MDA will improve; 
 
• If Port MDA improves, then risk-based decision making will improve; 
 
• If  risk-based decision making improves, then maritime homeland security 
at our ports will improve; 
 
• If maritime homeland security at ports improves, then the risk of port 
operations being disrupted due to terrorism or criminal activity will be 
reduced; 
 
• If the risk of port operations being disrupted due to terrorism or criminal 
activity is reduced, then ports have the potential to maximize trade 
throughput which contributes to national prosperity.  
 
In order to implement a strategy to develop 360 ° Port MDA significant 
coordination extending well beyond the bounds of a single jurisdiction or agency is 
needed.  Field testing the concept by briefing it to local level officials is a practical means 
of validating the concept, identifying obstacles and tightening the argument for briefs up 
the chain of command.  These briefs will also establish a nucleus of support needed to 
propel 360° Port MDA forward.  Implementation of 360° Port MDA should start with 
SeaHawk in order to leverage the attributes of the highly successful pilot program and to 
improve the likelihood of success.  Lessons learned at SeaHawk should then be applied to 





A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Our national security and prosperity depend in part on secure and competitive 
ports.  Effective public and private sector collaboration is needed to ensure our ports 
remain secure and competitive in a world with myriad security challenges and fierce 
global competition.  Although steps have been taken in the years since 9/11 to realize 
these twin goals, there is still much more that needs to be done.  The current MDA 
paradigm needs to be expanded to provide comprehensive awareness in our ports.  An 
effective OSINT program that succeeds in leveraging intermodal data is fundamental to 
better port level MDA.  The U.S. Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime 
homeland security, however, is without a service-wide strategy to exploit open sources.  
Although there is evidence that open sources are used at various echelons in the Coast 
Guard, the data sources and methods of developing and exploiting OSINT are variable.  
That open sources are ubiquitous may in fact partially explain why OSINT policy and 
strategy is lacking.  The ready access to open sources, save proprietary open sources, has 
allowed collection and analysis to remain a complementary if not subordinate activity 
subsumed within other intelligence efforts.  A strategy that structures the discipline of 
OSINT has the potential to more effectively leverage open sources needed to improve 
MDA in direct support of the goals and objectives of The National Strategy for Maritime 
Strategy.    
Although more robust domain awareness is necessary, it does not of itself 
guarantee improved port security.  Developing effective port level MDA and using it to 
enhance the security of our ports relies on the effective organization of public and private 
sector resources.  The joint operations centers called for in the SAFE Port Act, once 
broadened to include key intermodal players, provide an excellent organizational model 
to pursue enhanced port security. 
In summary, it is believed that an OSINT program that exploits intermodal data 
sources will contribute to more comprehensive domain awareness, thus enabling better 
risk-based decision making and improved port security.  
  
Figure 4.   360° Port MDA and Intermodal Port Cargo Flows 
 
 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS  
Port security is a complex and expansive undertaking, one that calls for an 
extraordinary level of coordinated effort between the public and private sector.  360° Port 
MDA raises the bar at a time when, to many, the bar may already seem unattainably high.  
We cannot afford to turn away from the challenges implicit in 360° Port MDA.  The need 
to improve security at our intermodal ports requires an approach that recognizes and 
addresses the vulnerabilities posed by intermodal operations.  It is hoped that the Coast 
Guard and other government and private sector entities with a stake in the operation and 
security of U.S. ports will cooperatively pursue the development and exploitation of 360° 
Port MDA.  
 
C. REMAINING QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although this paper outlines the concept of 360° Port MDA and initial steps to 








• Identification of relevant public and private sector open sources; 
• Selection criteria to focus open source collection efforts; 
• The development of anomaly detection rules related to intermodal port 
operations; 
• Integration of 360° Port MDA into the tactical risk-based decision making 
process for the Coast Guard and other port stakeholders; 
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